Gadamer, Dewey, and the importance of play in philosophical inquiry by Kirby, Christopher
Reason Papers Vol. 38, no. 1 
 
Reason Papers 38, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 8-20. Copyright © 2016 
 
Symposium: Philosophy of Play 
 
 
 
Gadamer, Dewey, and the Importance of Play in 
Philosophical Inquiry 
 
 
Christopher C. Kirby 
Eastern Washington University 
 
and 
 
Brolin Graham 
Independent Scholar 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past eighty years, studies in play have carved out a small, but 
increasingly significant, niche within the social sciences. Starting with Johan 
Huizinga’s Homo Ludens, and culminating in titles such as Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi’s Finding Flow, Stuart Brown’s Play, and Thomas 
Henricks’s Play Reconsidered and Play and the Human Condition, a rich 
repository has been built which underscores the importance of play to social, 
cultural, and psychological development.
1
 The general point running through 
these works is a philosophical recognition that play should not be separated 
from the trappings of everyday life, but instead should be seen as one of the 
more primordial aspects of human existence. We suggest that a deeper 
understanding of play might also provide insight into philosophical inquiry. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer is frequently associated with the topic of play, 
especially its connection to aesthetic experience. However, in Truth and 
Method, Gadamer follows Huizinga by insisting more broadly on the 
significance of play to human understanding, per se.
2
 For Gadamer, play 
                                                          
1 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949 [1938]); Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Finding Flow: 
The Psychology of Engagement with Everyday Life (New York: Basic Books, 1997); 
Stuart Brown, Play (New York: Penguin, 2009); Thomas Henricks, Play Reconsidered 
(Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2006); and Thomas Henricks, Play and 
the Human Condition (Champain, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015). 
 
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 2004).  
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discloses the full context of any given situation by promoting a freedom of 
possibilities within the horizon of one’s own life-world (that is, the world 
directly and immediately experienced). As such, his philosophical analysis of 
play is essential to his overall project of philosophical hermeneutics insofar as 
it explains how meaning is not derived from something essential within an 
artwork or a text, but rather is constructed from a full range of possibilities. As 
Monica Vilhauer puts it, Gadamer’s purpose is to establish play as “an 
alternative to modern scientific method . . . which brings forth genuine 
knowledge of genuine truth and has a structure all its own—a structure which 
must be accounted for if we are to have an accurate understanding of what 
knowledge and truth really are.”3 
We argue that there are good reasons to expand on the limited treatment 
of play within philosophical studies; we suggest that one way to do so is to 
compare Gadamer’s treatment of play with similar ideas from thinkers often 
associated with other philosophical schools. Although there are other 
candidates for such an analysis (for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s language 
games), we shall limit our comparison here to the notion of “transaction,” as 
employed by John Dewey in Knowing and the Known.
4
  Because Dewey 
introduces his conception of transaction in a volume that he intended as the 
culmination of an overarching philosophy of inquiry, we believe that 
comparing it to Gadamer’s use of play can highlight in at least two ways the 
deep philosophical import of this concept to understanding philosophical 
inquiry. First, traditional accounts of philosophical inquiry (including 
Dewey’s early work) have modeled themselves too heavily on the sciences by 
attempting to articulate some formal method. Gadamer’s notion of play and 
Dewey’s later characterization of transaction, however, both challenge such 
systematic approaches by supplanting traditional dualisms (for example, 
subject/object) with conceptual continuities (for example, events). Second, it 
is our position that an accurate portrayal of philosophical inquiry must include 
the trappings of lived experience, embodiment, and context, which are best 
understood in terms of play and transaction.         
 
2. Inquiry and Hegelian Bildung 
When it comes to the philosophy of inquiry, Gadamer and Dewey share a 
Hegelian influence. Taking over a line of thought from his mentor, Martin 
Heidegger, Gadamer offers an alternative to positivistic approaches in “self 
understanding, historical experience, representation, language, and truth” by 
                                                                                                                              
 
3 Monica Vilhauer, Gadamer’s Ethics of Play: Hermeneutics and the Other (Plymouth, 
UK: Lexington Books, 2010).  
 
4 John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, Knowing and the Known (New York: Beacon Press, 
1949). The essays comprising Knowing and the Known were originally published 
separately between 1944 and 1949 and were the culmination of a correspondence 
between Dewey and Bentley which began in November of 1932.  
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tying them to the concept of Bildung, which G. W. F. Hegel thinks of as 
education, in the sense of self-cultivation.
5
 As Heidegger argues, a basic 
structure in human understanding is the fact that Dasein (literally, human 
“there-being”) is always there with others, its surroundings being fully 
disclosed. The best way to understand this notion is perhaps through a rich 
metaphor occurring throughout much of Heidegger’s work, namely, one of a 
clearing [Lichtung] in the woods. When one walks among the trees, seeing 
one’s surroundings can be extremely difficult; however, when one steps into a 
clearing, the sunlight is unfiltered and everything is clearly seen. For 
Heidegger, each Dasein is in effect its own clearing. That is, understanding 
occurs when one steps into the clearing in which one’s surroundings are 
disclosed, or illuminated: “To say that [Dasein] is ‘illuminated’ [erleuchtet] 
means that as [there-being] it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any 
other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing.”6 What this means 
is the clearing, that is, the region [Gegend] where human understanding is 
possible, is a realm where the surrounding context is made explicit 
(illuminated) to the individual. Likewise, the clearing, as a wide-open space, 
is a place where there is room enough for free play to occur between one and 
one’s fellow speakers. 
Although Gadamer mentions Heidegger’s clearing metaphor only once in 
Truth and Method,
7
 it is obvious that Gadamer sees it as a key step in the 
“historical preparation” for his own work.8 The upshot of the idea for him is: 
  
[T]he universal nature of human Bildung [is] to constitute 
itself as a universal intellectual being. Whoever abandons 
himself to his particularity is ungebildet (“unformed”)—
e.g., if someone gives way to blind anger without measure 
or sense of proportion. Hegel shows that basically such a 
man is lacking in the power of abstraction. He cannot turn 
his gaze from himself towards something universal, from 
which his own particular being is determined in measure 
and proportion.
9
  
                                                          
5 Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1985).  See also G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. 
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), secs. 488-526.  
 
6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 2nd ed., trans. Joan Stambaugh (Ithaca, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2010), p. 129. 
 
7 Gadamer, Truth and Method, part 2, chap. 3. 
 
8 Cf. Richard E. Palmer. The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 135 and 323.  
 
9 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 11. 
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It is precisely here that we believe Gadamer’s view could benefit from a 
comparison with Dewey, particularly with regard to the latter’s emphasis on 
context, social intelligence, and democracy as a way of life—all of which 
could be encapsulated by what Dewey was calling “transaction” toward the 
end of his career. As James Good and James Garrison show, Dewey was also 
influenced by the Hegelian concept of Bildung, which played a role in the 
formation of his socio-political philosophy. In their words: 
 
Dewey’s connection to Hegel is apparent when we look 
specifically at Hegel’s account of human cognition. Not 
only do the two philosophers share the view that the self is 
always engaged in a project, they also agree that the self 
ordinarily proceeds in a state of harmony with its 
environment (Hegel's “natural consciousness”).10 
 
Dewey’s Hegelianism is imbued with organic notions from Aristotle and 
Charles Darwin, and he rejects the dialectic of Geist (understood in terms of 
the historically inevitable self-development of spirit) in favor of a more 
biological description of the dynamism of nature. On such an account, 
thought moves from potentiality to actuality, per Aristotle, as the objects of 
thought become known. On the other hand, being moves from potentiality to 
actuality, per Darwin, through natural selection. This reading renders the 
notion of telos (end or purpose) a type of biological end in both nature and 
thinking organisms. Dewey builds on Hegelian ideas insofar as he sees that 
 
the self is at one with its environment. Precisely because it 
is always engaged in a project, the self inevitably encounters 
obstacles, which Hegel terms “negations.” This occurrence 
renders consciousness asunder, identifying an object over 
and against the self (Gegenstand), the obstacle that 
disrupted its project. After analysis of the negation in the 
stage of understanding (Verstand), the self formulates 
solutions that alter both its project and the object, achieving 
a reunification of consciousness that allows the self to 
resume its project.
11
 
 
On Dewey’s transactional model, then, we can come to recognize 
experience as not only a “machine state” of the brain, but also an “output 
                                                          
10 James Good and James Garrison, “Traces of Hegelian Bildung in Dewey’s 
Philosophy,” in John Dewey and Continental Philosophy, ed. F. Paul (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2010). p. 49. 
 
11 Ibid. 
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state” of the body, as well as the subsequent change produced in the 
environment. In Gadamerian terms, it could be said that a subject’s play is 
actually an interplay with its context. In “A Propaedeutic to the Philosophical 
Hermeneutics of John Dewey,” Thomas Jeannot summarizes the connection 
thusly:  
 
For Dewey, primary experience occurs in the field of 
transactions between the “live creature” and environing 
conditions. It is not merely psychological or subjective but 
inclusive, encompassing both the subjects who experience 
and the subject matter (die Sache) of experience, both the 
“how” and the “what” of experience taken together in their 
mutual organic connections. Likewise, Gadamer’s famous 
excursus on “play” (Spiel) is strategically situated in Truth 
and Method to develop a phenomenological verification of 
essentially the same conception.
12
 
 
Jeannot sets the table for considering Dewey’s and Gadamer’s shared goal of 
contextualizing experience, that is, reinstituting the web of significance 
relations which surrounds every experience, even when taken severally. In 
Dewey’s view, any experience is always already “transactional,” whereas for 
Gadamer all experience is, at its core, hermeneutic. Jeannot maintains: “[I]t 
would be as fair to say of Dewey as of Gadamer that each seeks 
phenomenologically to shift the grounds of inquiry into the concrete 
existential phenomenon of understanding from epistemology to ontology.”13 
Gadamer also makes it a point to note that Edmund Husserl’s appeal to the 
“unity of a living organism,” as found in Husserliana VI, is intended to be 
more than a mere metaphor.
14
 Husserl (by Gadamer’s account) seeks to show 
that subjectivity should not be taken as the opposite of objectivity; 
phenomenology is actually intended to be correlation research, and (in a very 
Deweyan sentiment) the “poles” of subjective and objective are always 
contained within the whole.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Thomas Jeannot, “A Propaedeutic to the Philosophical Hermeneutics of John 
Dewey: Art as Experience and Truth and Method,” The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 15, no. 1 (2001), p. 2. 
 
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 250. See also Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to 
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1970). 
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3. Gadamer’s Notion of Play  
In Truth and Method, Gadamer follows Huizinga by pointing to a kind of 
seriousness in play, albeit one in which the player lightly holds the meaning of 
that with which he is playing.
15
 For Gadamer (and Huizinga), play is where 
old ideas are discarded and new ideas are “tried on.” This activity is the very 
process in which the world is socially structured and one affirms the sacred 
order of the universe itself. Jean Grondin points to the centrality of the 
sequence of play-festival-ritual in understanding how Gadamer believes that 
play structures the world.
16
  
As the first part of that sequence, play is the most basic and unstructured. 
According to Gadamer, play is simply a to-and-fro movement.
17
 This becomes 
evident in our use of it in language, as Gadamer points out, when we say, 
“The play of light, the play of the waves, the play of gears or parts of 
machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, even a 
play on words.”18 This may initially lead us to think of play as an interactional 
event, wherein there is a tension among the elements in play, as if they are 
opposed to one another. However, Gadamer shows otherwise: “yet in playing, 
all of those purposive relations that determine active and caring existence 
have not simply disappeared, but are curiously suspended . . . . Play fulfils its 
purpose only if the player loses himself in play.”19 As Huizinga puts it, play 
happens as a “free activity standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life 
as being ‘not serious,’ but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and 
utterly.”20  Such a statement points out that play, as an interpretive experience, 
remains open-ended to subsequent adjustments in interpretation. It is this 
openness that allows us to explore new possibilities. This gives us further 
insight into play as transaction, rather than inter-action. By characterizing 
play as a to-and-fro motion, it is likewise indicated that play takes place not 
between, but among, its players. This is why the structure of play cannot be 
pinned down—one cannot precisely point out where play happens. Play is a 
transactional experience, oriented toward the future but focused on the 
                                                          
15 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 103. 
 
16 Gadamer himself does not fully flesh out this sequence until his 1974 lecture “The 
Relevance of the Beautiful,” although its theoretical foundation can be found in Truth 
and Method; see Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Relevance of the Beautiful,” in Hans-
Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 126.  
 
17 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 104. 
 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Ibid., pp. 102-3. 
 
20 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p. 13. 
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present. Play cannot be found within any structure or any method, only within 
the transactions between organisms and their environment.  
This lack of structure arises from the fact that there can be no end in mind 
when one is playing. The to-and-fro motion of play indicates that the end is 
the same as the beginning. As Gadamer points out, the purpose of play is play 
itself.
21
 It may be more accurate to say, rather, that to-and-fro play moves in a 
circular manner: “In any case what is intended is to-and-fro movement that is 
not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end. . . . [R]ather, it renews itself 
in constant repetition.”22 Having no firm end in sight is also one of the most 
important requirements for the sort of transactional event that Dewey and 
Bentley describe in Knowing and the Known. It could be said that although 
play begins with no structure, a structure does eventually emerge. For 
example, if there are two people passing a Frisbee, one player does not throw 
the Frisbee in the opposite direction of the other player. To do so is to be a 
“spoilsport”; in not taking the play seriously, they would fail to engage 
properly in play. However, if they were to be asked in what framework of 
rules they play Frisbee, they would likely deny that there are rules of any 
form, yet, a structure develops. Without structure there would be no interplay. 
Furthermore, as they continue to play Frisbee, the players may try to do tricks, 
each one attempting to outdo the other. Yet even in this competitive spirit, one 
cannot put rules to the game without losing something.  
So as to elucidate Gadamer’s notion of the structuring of play we will 
shift the venue of our game of Frisbee from an isolated field to a stadium full 
of spectators. For Gadamer, play realizes its ideal when it becomes 
presentation, that is to say, when the players are fully immersed in their roles 
for the audience. Gadamer calls this the shift from “play” to “the play.” In this 
way, the audience, too, is brought into the realm of the play-world. 
Performance art is a prime example of such structured, yet still immersive, 
playing. 
When rules are applied to “the play,” however, it ceases to become play 
and instead becomes recreation. What is recreation? The word itself literally 
means to re-create. What it is attempting to recreate is the spirit of play found 
within that primal game. (This takes place, for example, when playing catch 
with a Frisbee is transformed into a sport like Ultimate Frisbee.) There is an 
attempt to return to the familiar (that is, Frisbee in and of itself) through the 
mediation of a structured form (Ultimate Frisbee).  There is, however, a 
difficulty in translation. For Frisbee, the structure is such that it naturally 
emerges through the interplay. Ultimate Frisbee attempts to re-create this 
structure antecedent to any play taking place. But how could a static system of 
rules (that is, method) ever duplicate the dynamic, organic understanding that 
occurs in play? Gadamer suggests that it would be difficult insofar as play is a 
                                                          
21 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 103. 
 
22 Ibid., p. 104. 
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process that one recognizes but cannot make an object of knowledge. In other 
words, play marks “the boundary of the objectifiable.”23 In play there is truth 
without any method, for method always covers over some aspect of truth. 
Thus, recreation is not the best means of duplicating the play phenomenon 
because it begins from an objective set of rules and therefore delimits the 
players as “subjects.” Any play that emerges within recreation happens in 
spite of, not because of, these initial conditions.  
This leads to festival, the next step in the sequence mentioned above. As 
Grondin explains, Gadamer elevates the meaning of festival to paradigmatic 
usage in his account of experience, which 
 
always wishes to be executed in this manner, i.e. to be 
“gone along with” . . . . The reason is that a festival is 
characterized by a certain temporality into which we are 
enticed. It occurs at a given time and all who participate in 
the festival are elevated to a festive state and, in the best 
case, are transformed into a festive mood.
24
 
 
Festival lends a rhythmic, temporal quality to our own lives, as well, insofar 
as a festival stands as a consummatory experience for the flow of experiences 
surrounding it—for example, celebrating the changing of the seasons, historic 
moments of the past, or major life changes. As Grondin translates Gadamer’s 
own words, “The festival is a commonality and is the representation of 
commonality itself in its consummated form.”25 Festival, in comparison with 
recreation, is more readily capable of lending the temporal experience of 
getting swept up in play, of what Gadamer calls “going along with.”  
As such, Gadamer argues that human beings, far from being in total 
control of the play enveloping them, are actually themselves played by the 
ritual structures of the past. As Grondin puts it:  
 
Human understanding, acting, feeling, and loving . . . have 
less to do with planning, control and being consciously 
aware, and much more to do with a subcutaneous fitting into 
the rituality of life, in forms of tradition, in an event that 
encompasses us and that we can grasp only stutteringly.
26
 
                                                          
23 Jean Grondin, “Play, Festival, and Ritual in Gadamer: On the Theme of the 
Immemorial in his Later Works,” in Language and Linguisticality in Gadamer’s 
Hermeneutics, ed. L. K. Schmidt (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), p. 45. 
 
24 Ibid., p. 54. 
 
25 Grondin, “Play, Festival, and Ritual in Gadamer,” p. 46. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
“Die Aktualität des Schönens,” in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 8 
(Tubingen: JCB Mohr, 1986), p. 130.   
 
26 Grondin, “Play, Festival, and Ritual in Gadamer,” p. 57. 
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4. Dewey’s Account of Transaction             
Like Gadamer, Dewey became increasingly frustrated over the course of 
his career with the dualistic tendencies in philosophical treatments of inquiry. 
He spent much of his life trying to overcome the subject-object dichotomy on 
which post-Cartesian epistemology traded.
27
 His work in Knowing and the 
Known seeks to “fix a set of leading words capable of firm use in the 
discussion of ‘knowings’ and ‘existings’ in that specialized region of research 
called the theory of knowledge.”28 This is the central motivation behind much 
of Dewey’s philosophy of inquiry. As he defines it: 
 
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of the original situation into a unified whole.
29
 
 
Dewey’s notion of “situation,” which he had used since his earliest work, 
becomes, in Knowing and the Known, tied more deeply to “events” and 
“occurrences.” As Dewey and Bentley explain:  
 
When an event is of the type that is readily observable in transition 
within the ordinary spans of human discrimination . . . we shall call it 
occurrence . . . . Thus, any one of the three words Situation, 
Occurrence and Object may, if focusing of attention shifts, spread 
over the range of the others. All being equally held as Event.
30
  
 
The similarities here between Deweyan “situations” and 
Heideggerian/Gadamerian “clearings” are more than superficial. All three 
thinkers were suspicious of Cartesian accounts of substance and turned instead 
                                                                                                                              
 
27 The collected Dewey-Bentley correspondence, published separately from Knowing 
and the Known, is a worthwhile study as a proving-ground for a terminology they 
hoped would clarify key concepts in John Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New 
York: Henry Holt, 1938). Though many terms used by Dewey were dropped for the 
publication of Knowing and the Known, one holdover was “inquiry,” indicating how 
much of the theoretical structure of their collaboration is owed to Dewey’s view. Cf. 
John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951, ed. 
S. Ratner and J. Altman (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964). 
 
28 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. xi. 
 
29 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Later Works, vol. 12 (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 108 (emphasis added). 
 
30 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. 70. 
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to “events” as the centerpieces of their ontologies. This also links up with the 
abandonment, in Knowing and the Known, of the separate terms “experience” 
and “knowledge” in favor of a single term—“knowing-known”—to cover 
both, as well as the choice to drop “individual” in favor of “organism.” Under 
this more precise terminology, Dewey and Bentley hope to make clear how 
human beings themselves were also events, in transaction with the events of 
their environment. As Dewey puts it elsewhere, “starting from the events that 
constitute life, living is a transaction which when it is analytically examined is 
found to be a continuous series of transactions carried on between organic 
structures and processes and environing conditions.”31 
Dewey and Bentley begin their account of transaction in Knowing and the 
Known by comparing it with two general frameworks used to explain the 
world in the history of Western philosophy. The most ancient is the self-
actional type of explanation, which Dewey and Bentley characterize as 
“where things are viewed as acting under their own power.”32 This is most 
apparent, perhaps, in early systemizations of physics, such as Aristotle’s, 
where the nature of the thing determines how it acts. By contrast, the 
explanatory framework handed down by the scientific revolution is one of 
interaction. Simply put, interaction is “where thing is balanced against thing in 
causal interconnectedness.”33 Dewey and Bentley cite Newtonian physics as 
the chief example of the reductive approach that such a framework 
precipitates. The primary premise of interaction seems reasonable enough. If 
one knows all of the input variables, then the conclusion must follow, and it 
seems no mistake that such a notion was developed during a period of history 
when great strides in mathematics where being made. However, such a 
framework presupposes a fixed and unalterable contextual structure in which 
these entities interact, a context that is often “omitted from the process 
itself.”34 Interaction models detach a subject matter from where it is situated; 
that is to say, they are inherently reductive, which is the greatest weakness of 
interactional thinking.  
Properly understood, Dewey’s notion of transaction recognizes the 
tendrils of meaning that spread out toward the past and the future as gathered 
at one point—the present—and brought into focus to show some specific 
meaning. In this way, Dewey seeks in his philosophy to incorporate further 
the organism into the environment. An organism, after all, does not live 
without the necessities of life, food, air, and water, so it makes sense that in 
                                                          
31 John Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2012), p. 235.  
 
32 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. 101. 
 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 Ibid., p. 106. 
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studying an organism, one must also study the organism’s relation to these 
things.
35
 
Consequently, a transactional way of viewing the world relies upon the 
continuity between knowings and knowns. Dewey and Bentley take knowings 
and knowns to share an intimate relationship, where a known is a “firm name” 
into which knowings inquire, thereby modifying those names to fit better what 
becomes known. This stresses the event of knowing over the “object” as 
known. As a result, knowledge requires an openness to future possibilities, 
while remaining firmly grounded in the present of what we take to be fact—
and this is precisely what Gadamer sees as the defining feature of play. 
To stop at knowings and knowns, however, is to fall into the same pitfalls 
that are put forward by self-action and interaction. To do so is to take the 
knower as a fixed, external part of the process, leaving us to search in vain for 
“clear and distinct” ideas and rendering knowledge abstract and vacuous. 
Dewey counters this by putting forward the conceptual sequence of fact, 
event, and designation. A fact is some aspect of the cosmos that can be 
known. Dewey emphasizes that facts, as real, are independent of the knower. 
The cosmos is thus wholly knowable, as all facts are knowable, but there is no 
underlying substratum to reality. Rather, facts become apparent through 
events. Events are stressed as “the extensional and the durational” activity in 
which we observe a fact.
36
 The observation of these events results in 
designation, or “naming as taking place in ‘fact.’”37 Knowledge is thus 
emphasized as concrete and experienced, as opposed to abstract and 
intellectual. When understood in this way, the similarities are striking between 
Dewey’s sequence of fact-event-designation and Gadamer’s sequence of play-
festival-ritual. 
The resulting picture is one where there is no outmoded reliance upon 
metaphysics in which meaning is put forward as a pre-epistemic entity. Nor is 
meaning epistemically centered, becoming vacuous, systematic, and abstract. 
Rather, the transactional model centers on knowledge as ontological. Dewey 
himself likens inquiry to embodied, organic processes in which an organism 
shapes and is shaped by its environment: 
 
Hunger is a state of organic imbalance constituting need, 
not, however, in a mentalistic sense, but as a condition of 
active uneasiness which manifests itself in search for 
foodstuffs . . . . This biological aspect of activity when it is 
analyzed as a prototype will be found to furnish all the 
conditions and processes that describe search or inquiry in 
                                                          
35 Ibid., p. 120. 
 
36 Ibid., p. 59. 
 
37 Ibid., p. 70. 
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its most thoroughly ideational or intellectual aspect . . . . [I]n 
order to accomplish the function of re-adaptation, which 
will effect re-integration of living activity (the office for 
which they are called into play in the case of inquiry), they 
have finally to take effect through overt activities which 
modify environing activities. Discourse is use of qualities 
which we can ourselves generate—such as sounds and 
marks on paper—when we require them—to serve as 
intermediary agencies for bringing into existence a unified 
life-activity.
38
 
 
Simply put, when inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge are understood 
transactionally, there is no need to posit some sort of primordial principle of 
intelligibility; the structures of meaning emerge through the activity itself. In 
Dewey’s terminology, organism and environment metabolize each other and 
produce growth. In Gadamerian terminology, play is an event that “raises into 
being” the players, the play things, and especially the play-world in an 
ongoing fashion.  
Growth, as an outcome of transactional inquiry, eradicates the supposed 
ontological distinction between abstract “Reason,” on the one hand, and 
immediate experience, on the other. According to Dewey, inquiry (and ipso 
facto, the growth that arises out of it) always already takes place in the having 
of an experience. Like Gadamer’s view of play, Dewey’s view of growth also 
had ontological implications. For instance, Dewey and Bentley see the cosmos 
“as system or field of factual inquiry,” humans “as organisms,” and humans’ 
behavior “as organic-environmental events.”39   
 
5. Conclusion 
Gadamer claims that it is the play-world that becomes “true” for those 
wrapped up in play. Play is thus not interpreted by contrasting it with our 
world. It does not subsist in any other reality; it is fully its own. In this way, 
Gadamer believes that the play-world represents truth. To understand play’s 
meaning is the same as understanding the everyday world, which is pushed 
into the background when we are in play but does not suddenly reappear to 
“transform things back to how they were” when play has concluded.40 Rather, 
it is play that makes this world more intelligible. The things of the world that 
are usually hidden are made known to us (or brought into presence) only 
through the structure of play. 
                                                          
38 Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, p. 224. 
 
39 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. 84. 
 
40 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 112. 
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When one inquires transactionally, one begins in the spirit of play, 
understanding that the meanings within the event are tentative.
41
 Furthermore, 
since these meanings are not fixed, one cannot predetermine the output for 
any given input, and as such, one must seek to bring out the emergent 
structure of the situation. Through this process, the inquirer, or knowing 
organism, grows in understanding of the relation between the knower and the 
event. This new understanding, in turn, becomes the basis of further inquiry. 
Thus, play, understood transactionally, appears to be basic to thinking 
philosophically—and free play is the cradle of inquiry. If we should hope to 
live in a world where more people live philosophically, then everyone 
(children and adults) must be afforded greater opportunities to play.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. 113. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
